Why U.S. Unilateral Action in Seabed Mining Threatens Its Own Supply Chains in the DRC & Zambia
Analysis of US deep-sea mining strategy, and subsequent impacts on future critical mineral supply chain security.
GEOPOLITICSCRITICAL MINERALSUS INFLUENCE IN AFRICA
Maxime Fawcett
9/20/20264 min read
Manganese, cobalt, copper and nickel are minerals deemed critical to a wide range of applications, from electric vehicles to defence. They are found in abundance in the deep seabed— in polymetallic nodules that take millions of years to form. The largest reserves are in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), lying deep in the North Pacific. In Washington’s bid to secure its supply chains against China, Trump has signed an executive order to begin harvesting these resources; extraction may begin as soon as 2027.
The CCZ sits in international waters regulated by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), consisting of 172 member states that are also parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under UNCLOS Article 136, the deep seabed's resources outside of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) are viewed as the "common heritage of humankind." The U.S. is notably not a member of UNCLOS; instead, it ratified the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (DSHMRA), designating NOAA as the national agency responsible for issuing licenses to explore and extract from the deep seabed. The ISA contains significant unresolved regulatory disagreements— despite Nauru invoking the two-year rule aiming to expedite the process.
Washington plans to shrug off the diplomatic tensions that may result from their actions, but it is clear the ISA and its member states are unlikely to respond convivially. China's foreign ministry spokesman, Guo Jiakun, said the push "violates international law and harms the overall interests of the international community." France's special envoy for the ocean, Olivier Poivre d'Arvor, echoed the sentiment: "The ocean is not there to affirm the leadership of a single country at the expense of all others and the multilateral process.”
The Trump administration may not be interested in the theoretical side of the degradation of its international standing. However, reputational damage may come at a significant cost to Washington’s ability to establish critical mineral supply chains in key 'swing' countries.
The DRC and Zambia are vital countries with overlapping strategic interests for the U.S. & China. China has significant influence in the region but is not necessarily liked for a variety of reasons, ranging from environmental damage to lack of local value addition. For example, Zambian Civic groups were angered amid a toxic spill by Sino Metals Leach, a Chinese-owned copper mine. This led to their operations being suspended. Another spill in November 2025 resulted in the DRC suspending the operations of a subsidiary of Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Company. These examples directly illustrate why citizens' opinions cannot be ignored by business, an argument that may prick ears more strongly in Washington.
Harvesting polymetallic nodules unilaterally will directly affect citizens by flooding the market with minerals they rely on in large part for their income. Under the ISA structure, benefit-sharing agreements are a key part of negotiations to ensure that developing countries do not lose out from extraction. Countries like DRC or Zambia derive over half their export earnings and a substantial share of gross domestic product from these metals. Were they to lose out on both revenue and compensation, both citizens' and diplomatic relations will be negatively affected.
Trump's tariffs have already "reduced enthusiasm for the US… at a time when some in sub-Saharan African nations have complained that Chinese investment is not benefiting the local population enough," argues Professor Less Branstetter, an international economist at Carnegie Mellon University. If tariffs have affected American influence, then it is reasonable to assume that disrupting revenues by unilaterally harvesting minerals, seen as the common heritage of humankind, will likely do the same.
The Brookings Institution parallels the importance of how America is viewed by governments via one of its four key recommendations to ensure U.S. influence in Africa's critical minerals. It argues that “Getting greater support from African governments and citizens can make U.S. investment more attractive than its competitors and can reduce the potential political risk to private investors considering local operations.”
This point only becomes stronger when we look at how the private sector is currently attempting to gain access in the region. Mrima Hill in Kenya is a substantial rare earth and Niobium deposit, which illustrates exactly how American firms may lose out from Washington’s reputational damage. The Kenyan government is currently considering two American companies out of a list of six from several nations that aim to develop the deposit. According to Frank Garcia, the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, American proposals are attempting to beat their competitors by promising they will add local value: by promising to develop local processing capabilities. The success of these proposals hinges on local governance believing that genuine local value will be added. If unilateralism in the seabed results in decreasing revenues for the very countries they aim to seek influence in, it may be increasingly difficult for local governments to give contracts to U.S. firms.
Even if there is political will to give these contracts to U.S. firms, the Brookings Institution’s previous mention of the importance of reducing political risk in securing private financing may be particularly relevant. Reducing political risk is key to the competitiveness and viability of U.S. projects. We have already seen that local protests against firms can halt their production. If local communities' livelihoods are impacted by U.S. unilateralism, they will be more likely to protest these activities, thus pushing up the political risk and therefore the cost of major projects. It may also be a factor in government deci Considering Washington’s strategy relies on the private sector, any increase in political risk may be acutely felt.
While there is some truth in the argument that most African countries' decision-making will not be affected by what occurs at the seabed; after all, private companies' ESG standards are separate from the actions of a volatile Trump administration. It is still the case that in securing the most competitive contracts it can only weaken their chances. With competition from China, the EU and the GCC, the U.S. cannot afford to make its proposals less attractive. Furthermore, locals may be even less likely to differentiate between American firms and the actions of the Trump administration in the seabed.